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Allocation in rural America?
By Jason Henderson and Maria Akers
water, one of the most fundamental resources for economic activ-
ity, covers about three-fourths of the earth’s surface—but only 2.5 per-
cent of that amount is considered fresh water. while freshwater supplies 
in the United States are relatively abundant, increasing demand and 
drought, especially in the Great Plains, have left some states wondering 
whether there is enough fresh water to go around.
The drive for greater efficiency in the use of water has led to the 
emergence of water markets. These markets allow for the equitable 
transfer of water rights from lower-value agricultural uses to higher-
value uses, such as for emerging industries and growing municipalities. 
many rural communities, though, view water markets as a threat to 
their economic foundation and future growth. 
This article explores how water markets affect both water right 
holders and their rural communities. The first section describes how 
drought and water demand are straining existing water resources. The 
second section details how the emerging water markets transfer rights 
for water from rural to urban use. The third section examines the eco-
nomic effects of water markets on rural communities. The article con-
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cludes that other mechanisms, in combination with water markets, may 
be needed to improve the efficiency of water allocation and compensate 
rural communities for lost economic activity. 
I.   Water Use In the tenth DIstrICt
water has always been the life blood of the Tenth District economy.1 
early pioneers of the Great Plains diverted water for crop irrigation, and 
since then, agriculture has been the largest user of water in the region. As 
the midwest economy became industrialized after world war ii, indus-
tries also became large water users. Today, these users are joined by rising 
urban populations, resulting in an unprecedented demand for water.
Growing demands for water have joined forces with nature to se-
verely strain existing water resources. over the past few years, persistent 
and severe drought has reduced stream flows, slashed water levels in 
district reservoirs, and depleted underground aquifers. in 2004, at the 
peak of the drought, many reservoirs in wyoming were only half full, 
with some shrinking below 10 percent of capacity (natural resourc-
es conservation Service). even after increased precipitation this year, 
many reservoirs remain below historical levels. 
Underground supplies of water have also declined. The High Plains 
aquifer, which underlies about 174,000 square miles of colorado, kan-
sas, nebraska, new mexico, oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and wy-
oming, has lost about 6 percent of its stored water (USGS). This loss 
would be enough water to cover 200 million acres of land a foot deep. 
in places like western nebraska, where current supplies are fully or over-
allocated, concerns over water are intense, especially since current use 
already meets, or even exceeds, projected long-term supplies (map 1).
 The list of demands on existing supplies is getting longer. in 2000, 
agriculture accounted for 85 percent of the water withdrawn for con-
sumptive use. over the past half-century, dependable electricity and 
modern irrigation techniques, such as center pivot irrigation, have al-
lowed farmers to tap groundwater sources, transforming semi-arid land 
into  productive  farmland  (comis;  Groundwater  Foundation).2  By 
1981, the number of irrigated acres in the Tenth District surged to over 
13 million (chart 1). By 2000, district irrigators were drawing 37 mil-
lion acre-feet of water per year, nearly twice withdrawals in 1950.3 Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  99
Map 1
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Similarly,  withdrawals  by  industrial  users  rose  sharply  following 
world war ii. rapid industrialization across the nation boosted manu-
facturing activity, peaking in the early 1980s. industrial water use has 
tended to be even higher in places like the Tenth District, where manu-
facturing is concentrated in traditional water-intensive industries, such 
as food, pulp and paper, chemicals, petroleum and coal, and primary 
metals industries (Hutson and others; white). 
ethanol is a prime example of how industrial activity can boost wa-
ter demand. Despite recent efficiency gains in using water, ethanol pro-
duction remains a water-intensive process.4 in nebraska, anecdotal re-
ports indicate that some ethanol plants have resorted to purchasing and 
then idling irrigated acres to acquire the water they need to operate. 
recently, increased conservation efforts have checked both agricul-
tural and industrial use. The rise in water withdrawals for agriculture has 
slowed since the 1980s, thanks to advances in irrigation technologies, 
increased conservation, and the stricter water quality standards imposed 
in the 1970s (Hutson and others). Still, over the past two decades, water 
demand has continued to rise, due largely to growing populations and 
rising incomes. 
Growing populations have increased the demand for power genera-
tion, which uses water as a coolant or to power turbines. From 1990 to 
2000, water use as a coolant in thermoelectric power generation climbed 
19 percent in district states, with the largest increases in kansas and ne-
braska. Hydroelectric use, where water is used to power turbines, has 
increased water demand in the district’s mountain states.5  
rising incomes, meanwhile, have increased the amount of water 
used for recreation, which in turn has boosted support for environmen-
tal preservation. The U.S. Fish and wildlife Service reports that wild-
life recreation participants—anglers, hunters, and wildlife watchers—
jumped 13.6 percent from 1996 to 2006, spurring tourism and creating 
additional demand for water along lakes, reservoirs, rivers, and streams 
throughout the district.6 At the same time, preserving endangered spe-
cies and their habitat has spurred demand for water in natural stream 
flows. For example, the USGS is currently examining the impact of wa-
ter use on the ecosystem of the Platte river area, which runs from south-
eastern wyoming through northern colorado and into nebraska.7 Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  101
But the biggest surge in water demand stems from rising household 
and commercial use in urban areas. over the past two decades, water 
for public services has boosted district water use 28 percent (chart 2). 
The largest gains in the district occurred in metro areas, where popula-
tion gains have been strongest.8 in metro counties, public service wa-
ter use rose 40.0 percent, compared to just 11.0 percent in nonmetro 
counties (USGS). 
expectations of rising populations are placing further pressure on 
the district’s scarce water resources. From 2000 to 2030, district popu-
lation levels are expected to rise 17.2 percent (Table 1). And, assuming 
no efficiency gains, public service water use should rise at a similar rate. 
The largest gains are expected in colorado, at 35 percent. improving 
the efficiency of water use could help alleviate some of the strain in the 
district, but even if public service use is capped at 2000 levels, per capita 
use would need to decline 15 percent to accommodate the expected 
growth. colorado would have to cut its per capita use 25 percent.
Chart 2
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II.   emergIng Water markets
The increased scarcity of water due to drought and increased use has 
raised tensions in reallocating water rights. For example, in the Platte 
river Basin in nebraska, debate has emerged over reducing agricultural 
water use in order to support the habitat of endangered fowl and fish spe-
cies (Platte river recovery). The potential loss of access to water sources 
has pitted recreational users against agricultural users in the niobrara 
river area in northern nebraska (Duggan). over the past decade, kansas 
and nebraska have battled over compliance with the water allocations 
in the republican river Basin (Aiken). existing water laws placed water 
rights primarily into the hands of agriculture. As new demands emerge, 
the desire for more efficient water allocation systems has intensified in 
the Tenth District, leading to the development of water markets.
on a national basis, water allocation is governed by state water 
compacts, agreements between states to coordinate long-term water 
management strategies. water compacts are federal law because they 
are ratified by the U.S. congress and are typically designed to limit 
the amount of water an upstream state can use, thereby guaranteeing 
downstream states a certain amount of water.9 most compacts divide 
Table 1






Total Public Service Use 
(million gallons)
Per capita Public 
Service Use
2000 2030 2000 2000
2030 (Assuming
2000 per capita use) 2000
2030 (Assuming 
2000 Total Use)
United States 281.4 363.6 0.86 43,300  48,104  178.9 138.5
District 20.1 23.5 0.85 3,595  3,583  210.8 179.8
colorado 4.3 5.8 0.87 899  1,053  240.2 178.4
kansas 2.7 2.9 0.93 416  423  166.4 152.1
missouri 5.6 6.4 0.85 872  852  183.4 159.5
nebraska 1.7 1.8 0.81 330  284  238.1 223.8
new mexico 1.8 2.1 0.80 296  273  203.4 176.2
oklahoma 3.5 3.9 0.91 675  697  215.0 189.6
wyoming 0.5 0.5 0.82 107  93  264.3 249.5
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water supplies on a percentage basis. For example, the republican riv-
er compact, ratified in 1942, allocated 49 percent of the republican 
river’s average annual water supply to nebraska, 40 percent to kansas, 
and 11 percent to colorado, in proportion to the number of irrigated 
acres in the water basin in each state at that time. 
Despite interstate compacts, disputes over water allocations have 
remained common, often requiring lawsuits to enforce compact terms. 
For example, in 1998 kansas filed a lawsuit against nebraska and 
colorado before the U.S. Supreme court to enforce the terms of the 
republican river compact. After the filing, the states involved agreed 
to a formal mediation process rather than costly litigation, and they 
arrived at a final settlement that was then approved by the Supreme 
court. However, recent drought conditions have threatened the reso-
lution, and kansas is again challenging nebraska over water use in the 
republican river (Aiken). over time, most of the states in the Tenth 
District have been involved in legal negotiations regarding compliance 
with interstate water compacts.
inside state borders, water use rights in the Tenth District are gov-
erned by prior appropriation laws. The doctrine of prior appropria-
tion, or “first in time, first in right,” gives senior water rights to the 
first party that puts the water to a beneficial use. in this way, the senior 
appropriator establishes a priority date and acquires the right to divert 
water from an originating source, stream, river, or underground aqui-
fer for a specific use at a particular location against later users or ju-
nior appropriators. Junior appropriators cannot use the water until the 
senior appropriator’s claim is satisfied, and senior appropriators may 
not change any component of the original water right if it will affect a 
junior appropriator. continued use of water is often necessary to retain 
priority status, and water rights may be lost by non-use.10  
Under prior appropriation, water rights may not always result in 
the most valuable economic use. Today, agriculture still holds a large 
share of appropriated water rights due to the water use of early pio-
neers. As current water systems strain to meet rising demand, pressure 
mounts to reallocate water rights on the basis of improving the effi-
ciency or the value of economic activity per unit of water. The pressure 
is particularly intense when the economic value of new types of water 
use is higher than traditional agricultural use.104  FEDERAl RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
economists have long promoted the use of water markets as a 
mechanism to efficiently transfer water to its highest economic use 
(Howitt and Hansen; Gaffney). markets bring producers and consum-
ers together to agree upon the price and quantity of a good or service 
based on the cost of production and benefits of use. However, private 
markets were not historically considered to be the best mechanism by 
which to allocate environmental goods because of externalities—that 
is, the costs and benefits to stakeholders who do not participate in the 
market transaction. For example, diverting water from irrigated to mu-
nicipal use could alter water flows that may affect environmental condi-
tions. However, new insights into externalities have increased interest in 
the use of markets to enhance the efficiency of allocating environmental 
goods (eigenraam and others). 
one of the primary benefits of water markets is the ease in which 
water allocations can be altered. Under current laws, water allocations 
are fairly rigid, and changes in water use are often associated with costly 
and time-consuming negotiations and litigation. with markets, the 
transaction costs associated with water allocations are much lower. As 
long as sellers and buyers can meet and agree, they can arrange to per-
manently sell or temporarily lease water rights.
water markets are also effective allocation mechanisms because they 
provide a flexible, transparent way to value water under varying supply 
and demand conditions. when water is scarce, the value or price will 
rise and vice versa when water is plentiful. For example, in the colo-
rado Big Thompson (cBT) water market, which allocates water from 
the colorado river on the western slope of the continental Divide to 
the eastern slope of the rocky mountains, water prices surged to over 
$13,000 per acre-foot in november 2002 as drought conditions in-
tensified (water Strategist). By 2007, increased precipitation prompted 
water prices to fall below $11,000 per acre-foot, before rising slightly in 
2008 as drought conditions reappeared. 
Given the rise in nonagricultural use, a common result of water 
markets is the transfer of water rights from agricultural to urban users. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) found that during the 
1990s, water markets in the western United States often led to a transfer 
of water rights from rural to urban users (Gollehon). over the past de-
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in western states has continued to rise steadily, while agricultural-to-ag-
ricultural transfers have declined (Brewer, Glennon, ker, and libecap). 
in 2006, 41 of the 50 sales in the cBT market involved irrigators sell-
ing water rights to municipal users. market transactions from the cBT 
indicate that environmental purchases of water to restore wetlands and 
wildlife habitat are also increasing (water Strategist).
The benefit of water markets is that the holders of water rights  —
typically agricultural producers—are compensated for their economic 
losses if they agree to transfer water to nonagricultural users. Assume 
that  an  agricultural  producer  considers  selling  or  leasing  his  water 
rights. if the price of water is greater than the value earned from irriga-
tion, the farmer could sell or lease his water right and convert his land 
to nonirrigated cropland. or, if the price of water is less than the value 
earned from irrigation, the farmer could retain the water right and ir-
rigate his cropland. As a result, the implementation of a water market 
could improve the economic position of the agricultural producer, as 
he could earn higher incomes through irrigation or a combination of 
nonirrigated production with the sale or lease of water rights. 
while the transfer of water rights through markets compensates sell-
ers for their loss of water, markets typically do not account for the exter-
nalities, or the third-party impacts, of reduced water supplies (zilberman 
and Schoengold). For example, markets do not compensate society for 
the public value of water that may be affected. individuals who own wa-
ter rights may be willing to sell them for nonlocal use, despite the effects 
on the rural communities that rely on the water to support local eco-
nomic activity. water conflicts often arise from the difficulties of markets 
to value the third-party impacts that may result from such transfers.
III.  What  Is  the  valUe  of  Water  for  rUral   
CommUnItIes?
while water markets offer the potential to improve the efficiency 
of water allocation and compensate water right holders for lost income, 
the lack of information regarding the overall economic impact of a 
proposed reallocation is often the primary hurdle in addressing water 
conflicts (eigenraam and others). research indicates that the transfer of 
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interests and rural communities (Gollehon). Thus, water reallocation 
in the Great Plains is typically viewed as a threat to local economies. As 
with transfers in the republican river Basin in nebraska, the economic 
impacts can be large and often affect farm and farm-related industries. 
The economic impacts of water losses can be separated into direct 
and spillover effects. The direct effects involve the water right holders 
themselves. in rural areas, water right holders are typically crop produc-
ers, who are compensated for their loss of income from their crops. The 
transfer of water and reduced irrigation lowers incomes by reducing 
crop yields and by shifting crop plantings toward crops that tend to 
generate lower revenues. 
Spillover effects emerge as the lower farm incomes lead to less business 
activity and less household spending in the community. The switching 
from irrigated to nonirrigated production reduces nonfarm incomes, 
because nonirrigated crop production has smaller ripple effects on the 
rest of the economy. For example, farmers use less nitrogen fertilizer for 
nonirrigated corn production, which reduces sales by agricultural input 
firms (Selley and others). Smaller crops from nonirrigated production 
also reduce the transportation and storage needs for the crop, as well as 
the ability of the local farm sector to feed livestock and support addi-
tional processing activity. Thus, measuring the full economic impact of 
water transfers hinges on identifying impacts on the farm economy and 
on the links between farm and nonfarm activity in the region.
The value of irrigation (direct effects)
Several methods can identify the value of irrigation, or the direct 
effects on typical water right holders (Young).11 optimization models 
help analyze the impact of reducing water supplies on crop yields and 
crop planting mix. For example, a water optimization model developed 
by the University of nebraska indicates that smaller water allocations 
lead to lower crop yields, fewer acres of irrigated corn plantings, in-
creased plantings of wheat, and lower net returns. 
Another way to approximate the value of irrigation is to compare 
cash rents for irrigated and nonirrigated cropland (Supalla, Buell, and 
mcmullen). in an efficient land market, cash rents reflect the net re-
turns farmers expect to receive from crop production. Because farmers 
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sions, the difference in irrigated and nonirrigated cash rents reflects the 
economic value of irrigation through both increasing yields and altering 
the crop mix. Higher cash rents for irrigated cropland reflect higher an-
nual net returns (chart 3). 
The differences in irrigated and nonirrigated cash rents vary across 
location and over time. For example, in 2008 the difference between 
irrigated and nonirrigated cash rents in colorado was roughly 33 per-
cent higher than in nebraska. cash rents also vary within states. in ne-
braska, the largest difference is in the drought-prone northwestern parts 
of the state, and the smallest difference is in the eastern part, where 
rainfall is more plentiful (Johnson 2007). The difference in cash rents 
also changes over time, as crop prices and irrigation costs change, thus 
shaping overall net returns. 
estimates of the value of irrigation based on cash rental rates are 
consistent with optimization models of crop planting decisions. Using 
nebraska’s water optimization model, the annual losses in net farm rev-
enue associated with converting irrigated acres to nonirrigated produc-
tion in the republican and central Platte river basins were estimated 
at $83 and $72 per acre, respectively (Supalla, Buell, and mcmullen). 
in 2007, the difference between cash rental rates in southwestern and 
southern nebraska ranged from $69 to $99 per acre, depending on the 
type of irrigation (Johnson 2008). 
Business and household spending effects (spillover effects)
input-output  models  can  measure  the  economic  links  between 
industries and thus can help estimate the spillover, or third-party, ef-
fects of reduced farm income (Supalla and nedved; lamphear; Supalla, 
Buell, and mcmullen; Thompson). These models estimate the indirect 
effects of fewer business transactions and less personal spending due to 
lower farm earnings. input-output models derive multipliers from the 
industry interactions. The multipliers can then be used to estimate the 
value of economic activity lost due to a $1 loss in economic output.12
economic multipliers are often location-specific and vary with the 
presence of agricultural service and manufacturing firms contained in 
the area. For example, economic multipliers for agriculture in nebraska 
typically range from 2.1 to 2.4 (lamhear). other studies of nebraska’s 
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(Thompson). in colorado, similar variations emerge, as the statewide 
economic multiplier for agriculture has been estimated at 1.67 but 
ranges from 1.78 in the eastern part of the South Platte river Basin to 
1.25 in the republican river Basin (Thorvaldson and Pritchett). The 
off-farm impacts tend to be concentrated in farm input industries, de-
pository institutions, and wholesale and transportation companies.
The current conflict between kansas and nebraska over water in the 
republican river Basin shows the potential economic impact of water 
reductions. kansas is currently challenging nebraska’s water withdraw-
als in the republican river Basin (Aiken). To resolve the issue, kansas 
proposed that nebraska retire 515,000 acres from irrigated production. 
in contrast, the nebraska Department of natural resources (Dnr) in-
dicates that compliance could require reducing irrigated ground water 
allocations by roughly a third throughout the river basin. 
Both proposals to reallocate water from nebraska to kansas could 
pose potentially sizable economic losses in nebraska’s republican river 
Basin. Under the kansas proposal, converting 515,000 irrigated acres 
to nonirrigated production leads to a direct economic loss of $58.7 mil-
lion (Table 2). Under the nebraska alternative, water allocations would 
be reduced by roughly a third on all irrigated acres in the republican 
Chart 3
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river region. Using a water optimization model, the direct economic 
loss of reduced groundwater allocations could reach $59 million as ir-
rigated corn production declines and is replaced with increased nonir-
rigated wheat production (Appendix A).13 
According to an input-output model of the republican river Basin, 
total economic losses could reach $73.9 million due to reduced busi-
ness and household spending. Based on the economic links between 
industries, the model estimated a total economic multiplier of 1.25, 
consistent with previous republican river Basin studies (Thorvaldson 
and Pritchett 2006; Thompson). The multiplier indicates that, for ev-
ery dollar loss from reduced irrigation, total economic losses would be 
$1.25—one dollar from direct economic losses and 25 cents from spill-
over effects. As a result, direct economic losses of $59 million could lead 
to total economic losses of $73.9 million, with spillover effects from re-
duced business and household spending of $14.7 million per year. Total 
economic losses would account for roughly 5 percent of the republican 
river Basin’s $1.5 billion in value-added activity, where value-added 
activity measures the additional economic income or value generated 
from production activity above and beyond the cost of inputs, similar 
to the gross domestic product measure at the national level.14  
Under the kansas and nebraska proposals, both the cash rent and 
optimization model analyses result in similar estimates of economic 
loss. However, this is usually not the case as the size of the direct eco-
nomic impacts often varies by the analysis used. For example, assume 
water markets completely eliminated irrigation in the region by trans-
ferring all of the water rights from agricultural use to an alternative use 
outside the region. in this extreme case, if all 973,000 irrigated acres 
in the nebraska republican river Basin were retired and converted 
to nonirrigated production, direct economic impacts could approach 
$111 million, according to cash rent analysis. The water optimization 
model, however, suggests that direct economic losses could reach $225 
million if water allocations were eliminated (Table 3).15 Such disagree-
ments over the size of the direct economic effects are often the barriers 
to solving water conflicts.
moreover, the indirect economic effects are often imprecisely mea-
sured for a variety of reasons, creating further barriers to solving water 
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count for the economic effects of “forward” linkages emerging from 
reduced crop production, which reduce the need for storage, transpor-
tation, processing, and feeding grain (Thorvaldson and Pritchett). 
Second, the indirect effects do not account for the value of non-
consumptive use, primarily recreation and environmental use from wa-
ter diversions (Young; renzetti). For example, based on 2006 data, the 
economic value of water from angling and rafting on various colorado 
rivers ranged from $18 to $358 per acre-foot (loomis). 
Third, input-output models are static in nature and do not allow for 
changes in local labor availability over time (Young). research indicates 
that the spillover effects of water markets and transfers depend on how 
people respond to reduced economic activity in the community. in the 
face of water restrictions and reduced economic activity, people could 
decide to leave rural communities in search of alternative economic op-
portunities, leading to an income flight. if large migrations occur, per 
capita welfare in the community would decline; alternatively, if people 
remain, per capita welfare would rise (Bourgeon, easter, and Smith). 
Nonmarket mechanisms to offset spillover effects
Given the challenges to estimating the direct and indirect impacts 
of reduced water allocations and the barriers they present to solving 
water conflicts, a benefit of water markets is their ability to compen-
Table 2
economic  imPAcT  oF  reDUcinG  GroUnDwATer   
AllocATionS in neBrASkA’S rePUBlicAn river BASin
Kansas Proposal (Cash Rent Analysis) Nebraska Proposal (Water optimization Model)
irrigated Acres (Thousands)A 515 Total net returns (million dollars)D
irrigated/nonirrigated cash rent differenceB
     (Dollars per acre)
$114      current water allocation
   reduced water allocation
$473.1 
$414.1
Direct impact (million dollars) $58.7 Direct impacts $59.0
Total economic impact 
(million dollars)c
$73.4 Total economic impact 
(million dollars)c
 $73.8
Spillover impact (million dollars) $14.7 Spillover impact (million dollars)  $14.8
AFor a brief description of the kansas Proposal, see Aikens (2008)     
Bnebraska cash rent information for southern nebraska obtained from Johnson (2008) 
ceconomic multiplier of 1.25 used to calculate total economic impact.   
DAppendix A provides more details on the water optimization model resultsEconomic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  111
sate water right holders for their direct economic losses. However, rural 
communities would continue to face spillover effects due to reduced 
spending by businesses and households. These effects could be offset in 
a number of ways, including transfer payments, water taxes, or regula-
tions on water use (loehman and loomis). 
Transfer payments, or subsidies, from regions receiving water rights 
to those relinquishing them could offset the economic losses in rural 
communities. conceptually, regions receiving water earn positive spill-
over benefits through increased business and household spending. Giv-
en the improved efficiency of water allocation to higher valued produc-
tion, these positive spillover benefits should be greater than the losses 
in the region relinquishing water rights. with transfer payments, the 
economic losses in regions relinquishing water rights could be offset, 
and regions receiving water rights could still enjoy increased economic 
activity emerging from the efficiency gains of water allocation. 
Water taxes could be used to account for the spillover effects and 
compensate rural communities. conceptually, a water tax could be 
placed on any water right transfer that would be equal to the loss of 
public benefits (spillover effects) associated with the transfer of water 
(loehman and loomis). By increasing the cost of purchasing water 
rights, the tax would reduce water transactions and maintain water in 
the rural community for public use. moreover, if a water transaction 
occurs, the tax payment to a public institution compensates the com-
munity for lost public benefits. 
Table 3
economic imPAcT oF no irriGATion in neBrASkA’S 
rePUBlicAn river BASin
Cash Rent Analysis Water optimization Model
irrigated Acres (Thousands)A 973 Total net returns (million dollars)D
irrigated/nonirrigated cash rent differenceB
     (Dollars per acre) $114
     current water allocation
     no water allocation
 $473.1 
$248.6
Direct impact (million dollars) $110.9  Direct impacts  $224.5 
Total economic impact (million dollars)c  $138.7  Total economic impact 
(million dollars)c
 $280.6 
Spillover impact (million dollars)  $27.7  Spillover impact (million dollars)  $56.1 
Airrigated acres obtained from USDA             
Bnebraska cash rent information for southern nebraska obtained from Johnson (2008)     
ceconomic multiplier of 1.25 used to calculate total economic impact.       
DAppendix A provides more details on the water optimization model results       
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Regulations that restrict water use are another way to account for 
the public value of water. limits or restrictions on water right sales 
could be used to preserve water in rural communities. For example, 
a public institution could be given control of a portion of the exist-
ing water rights to preserve water access for public use in the com-
munity. research indicates that to compensate for environmental and 
third-party spillover losses, up to 25 percent of the water many need 
to be transferred to public control (zilberman and Schoengold). The 
challenge with transfer payments, taxes, and regulations is measuring 
precisely the indirect effects and identifying the appropriate level of 
payment, tax, or regulation to offset these impacts.
Iv.   ConClUsIon
water has shaped the economic fortunes of many rural communi-
ties. over the past decade, drought has strained water supplies through-
out the district. At the same time, increased urban demand is outpacing 
current water resources. Throughout the district, conflicts have arisen 
over water reallocations and their associated economic effects. 
water markets improve the efficiency of water allocation by trans-
ferring water from low-value to high-value use. But uncertainty regard-
ing the economic impacts of water transfers on rural communities has 
limited the implementation of water markets. Thus, information on 
the economic effects of water reallocation and improved methods of 
estimating the economic losses of transferring water outside rural com-
munities are sorely needed. 
water markets have emerged as a preferred way to allocate water. 
markets not only improve the efficiency of water use, but they also 
compensate  existing  water  right  holders—farmers—for  their  direct 
economic losses from reduced irrigation. Still, markets struggle to ac-
count for the public benefits of water use or the spillover effects of 
reduced household and business spending. nonmarket mechanisms, 
such as transfer payments, taxes, or regulations, may be needed to ac-
count for the public benefits and spillover effects of water reallocation. 
while not perfect, the implementation of water markets can be a major 
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enDnoTeS
1The Tenth Federal reserve District encompasses the states of nebraska, 
kansas, oklahoma, colorado, wyoming, the western third of missouri and the 
northern half of new mexico. 
2in the Tenth District, the source of irrigation water varies by geographic 
location. in the Plains, ground water is the primary source of irrigation water, 
accounting for 96 and 92 percent of the irrigation water in nebraska and kansas 
in 2000, respectively. in the mountains, surface water is the primary water source, 
accounting for 90 and 81 percent of irrigation water in wyoming and colorado 
in 2000, respectively, fed by mountain streams and run-off from winter snows.
3An acre-foot is the volume of water needed to cover an acre of land to a 
depth of one foot. State and county level water use data are available from the 
U.S. Geological Service, http://water.usgs.gov/watuse/.
4recent estimates indicate that roughly three gallons of water are required 
to produce a single gallon of ethanol, down from six gallons of water a few years 
ago (keeney and muller). increased ethanol production and the resulting higher 
corn prices have also led to an increase in water demand as more irrigated acres 
are planted to corn, a crop that uses more water than other types of crops.
5Thermoelectric and hydroelectric power generation is generally considered 
to be non-consumptive as water is ultimately returned to stream flows.
6For example, in 2006, the state recreation area at the ogallala reservoir in 
nebraska had 808,000 visitors during 2006, with 70 percent of them out-of-state 
visitors (what’s Sport Fishing worth).
7information on the Platte river Program, USGS Priority ecosystem Pro-
gram, is available at http://ne.water.usgs.gov/platte/.
8Both surface and ground water sources are used to provide public service 
water in the district. in 2000, over 80 percent of nebraska’s public service water 
came from groundwater sources, while 94 percent of the public service water in 
colorado came from surface water sources.
9According to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database at oregon 
State University, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/, Tenth District 
states participate in 22 separate water compacts, with some dating back to 1922.
10Under prior appropriation, water rights are independent of the land where 
the water originates or where it is used, as the water is typically diverted from the 
source. Appropriated water rights can be sold, transferred, leased, or mortgaged 
separately from the land if allowed by state regulations.
11A comprehensive assessment of the various methods used to analyze the 
economic value of irrigation is provided in chapter 5 of Young. The methods 
include both inductive and deductive techniques ranging from hedonic property 
value, optimization, and willingness to pay, to representative farm models.
12Young (2005) provides a critic of input-output models used to analyze 
the economic impact of water. one drawback of input-output models is their Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  115
static nature, which does not account for the ability of economic participants to 
substitute other goods and services into their production functions, nor do they 
account for resource constraints. 
13in 2006, studies analyzing the effect of smaller reductions in irrigation in 
nebraska’s republican river Basin found consistent results. Assuming 14 to 18 
percent reductions in water allocations across the republican river Basin, annual 
costs were expected to reach $20.7 million per year (Supalla, Buell, mcmullen). 
when 118,000 acres of irrigated land was transferred to non-irrigated use, total 
direct and spillover costs were expected to reach $14.7 million (Supalla, Buell, 
mcmullen). when irrigated cropland in the river basin was to be laid fallow, 
direct and spillover effects were expected to reach $81 million annually. (Thomp-
son).
14Using 2005 imPlAn values inflated to 2007 dollars, total industry output 
in the republican river Basin was $3.3 billion and total value added at $1.5 bil-
lion, with value added activity from crop production at roughly $440 million.
15The large difference in farm sector losses between cash rents and optimi-
zation models could reflect the fact that the $114 per acre cash rent difference 
incorporated nonirrigated acres with and without irrigation potential. Statewide 
in nebraska, nonirrigated land with irrigation potential has a higher cash rent 
than land without irrigation potential. if a water market eliminated potential 
irrigation, the expected $114 per acre loss would be too low.116  FEDERAl RESERVE BANK oF KANSAS CITy
reFerenceS
Aiken, J. David. 2008. “The republican river: negotiation, Arbitration, and a 
Federal water master,” University of nebraska-lincoln, institute of Agricul-
ture and natural resources, Department of Agricultural economics, Corn-
husker Economics, July 9.
Bourgeon, Jean-marc, k. william easter, and rodney B.w. Smith. 2009. “water 
markets and Third-Party effects,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
vol. 90, no. 4, november, pp. 902-17.
chan, Arthur H. 1990. “rural community values in Groundwater marketing,” 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 24, no. 2, June, pp. 463-72.
comis, Don. 1994. “wind Power where You want it,” Agricultural research 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural research, June.
Duggan, Joe. 2007. “commission Seeks moratorium on niobrara river Diver-
sions,” lincoln Journal Star, may 24 and online at JournalStar.com, obtained 
may 25. 
eigenraam,  mark,  Gary  Stoneham,  craig  Beverly,  and  James  Todd.  2005. 
“emerging environmental markets: A catchment modeling Framework to 
meet new information requirements,” oecD workshop on Agriculture 
and water: Sustainability, markets And Policies, Adelaide, South Australia, 
november 14-18.
Gaffney, mason. 1997. “what Price water marketing? california’s new Frontier,” 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 475-520.
Gollehon, noel. 1999. “water markets - implications for rural Areas of the 
west,” Rural Development Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 57-63.
Hendee, David. 2007. “Farmer Again to Get less Big mac water,” omaha World- 
Herald, September 5.
Howitt, richard, and kristiana Hansen. 2005. “The evolving western water 
markets,” Choices, first quarter, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 59-63.
Hutson, Susan S., nancy l. Barber, Joan F. kenny, kristin S. linsey, Deborah S. 
lumia, and molly A. maupin. 2005. “estimated Use of water in the United 
States in 2000,” U.S. Geological Survey, USGS circular 1268, at http://pubs.
usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/.
Johnson, Bruce. 2008. “nebraska Farmland values and cash rents rise Sharply,” 
institute of Agriculture and natural resources, Department of Agricultural 
economics, University of nebraska-lincoln, Cornhusker Economics, march 19. 
__________. 2007. “ethanol Fueling land market Advances,” institute of Agri-
culture and natural resources, Department of Agricultural economics, Uni-
versity of nebraska-lincoln, Cornhusker Economics, march 21. 
lamphear, charles. 2005. “economic importance of irrigated Agriculture 2003” 
mimeo, nebraska Policy institute.
loehman, edna, and John loomis. 2008. “in-Stream Flow as a Public Good: Pos-
sibilities for economic organization and voluntary local Provision,” Review 
of Agricultural Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 445-56.
loomis, John. 2008. “The economic contribution of in-stream Flows in colora-
do: How Angling and rafting Use increase with instream Flows,” colorado 
State University, extension Publication, eDr-08-02. Economic REviEw • FouRth quaRtER 2008  117
natural resources conservation Service (nrcS), U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. 2004. “wyoming Basin outlook report,” January, www.wrds.uwyo.edu/
wrds/nrcs/snowpack/snowmap.html.
nebraska Department of natural resources. 2002. “what’s Sport Fishing worth 
in nebraska?” http://dnr.ne.gov/watertaskforce/Presentations/Recreation.doc.
Platte river recovery implementation Program. 2006. “economic impacts to the 
State of nebraska,” october.
Groundwater Foundation. 2005. rainmakers: A Photographic Story of center 
Pivots, lincoln, nebraska.
renzetti, Steven. 2002. The economics of water Demands, norwell, mass.: klu-
wer Academic Press.
Selley, roger A., Tina Barrett, robert n. klein, Paul Hay, Tom Homan, keith 
Jarvi, ron Seymour, and Gary zoubek. 2006. “nebraska crop Budgets,” 
ec872 University of nebraska-lincoln extension, www.ianrpubs.unl.edu/
epublic/live/ec872/build/ec872.pdf, obtained August 15, 2007.
Supalla, ray, Tom Buell, and Brian mcmullen. 2006. “economic and State Bud-
get cost of reducing consumptive Use of irrigated water in the Platte and 
republican Basins,” http://agecon.unl.edu/supalla/watercost.pdf, obtained Au-
gust 1, 2007.
Suppalla,  ray  and  Scott  nedved.  2004.  “Potential  economic  impacts  from 
Groundwater regulation in the republican valley” mimeo, University of 
nebraska-lincoln.
Thompson, eric. 2007. “The economic impact of reduced irrigation in the re-
publican river Basin,” Bureau of Business research, Department of eco-
nomics, University of nebraska-lincoln.
Thorvaldson, Jennifer, and James Pritchett. 2006. “economic impact of reduced 
irrigated Acreage in Four river Basins in colorado,” colorado water re-
source research institute, completion report no. 207, December.
United nations educational Scientific and cultural organization (UneSco). 
2003. “water for People, water for life,” world water Development report, 
www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/.
U.S. Geological Service (USGS). 2008. water Use in the United States, http://
water.usgs.gov/watuse/.
water Strategist. various issues (2005-08). “Analysis of water marketing, Finance, 
legislation and litigation,” www.waterstrategist.com.
white, Gilbert F. 1960. “industrial water Use: A review,” Geographical Review, 
vol. 50, no. 3, July, pp. 412-30. 
Young, robert A. 2005. Determining the economic value of water: concepts 
and methods, resources for the Future, washington Dc. 
zilberman, David, and karina Schoengold. 2005. “The Use of Pricing and mar-
kets for water Allocation,” Canadian Water Resources Journal, vol. 30, no. 1, 
pp. 1 -10.